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I. Introduction
Developing country stock markets account for a disproportionately large share of the
boom in global stock market activity.  The value of equity market transactions in emerging
economies soared from about 2 percent of the world total in 1986 to 12 percent in 1996.
1  This
boom was accompanied by an explosion of international capital flows, especially flows into
developing country stock markets.  Net private capital flows to developing nations jumped ten-
fold over the past decade, exceeding $250 billion in 1996.
2  Moreover, while equity flows were a
negligible part of capital flows to emerging markets a decade ago, equity flows now represent
about 20 percent of private capital flows to developing nations.
These developments raise critical questions for policymakers.  Are developing country
stock markets simply casinos where an increasing number of foreigners are coming to place bets?
Or, are the developing countries themselves reaping large benefits?  If better stock markets are
important catalysts of economic development, what can policymakers do to improve the
functioning of their bourses?
In addressing these policy issues, this paper makes three points.
•  First, stock market development, especially stock market liquidity, exerts a positive,
first-order impact on economic development.  A growing body of research supports
the view espoused by Walter Bagehot over 100 years ago: better functioning
financial markets cause faster economic growth.
•  Second, particular laws and regulations materially affect the operation of stock
markets.  Cross-country differences in laws concerning the rights of shareholders,
especially minority shareholders, help explain the level of stock market development.
Also, countries with companies that provide high-quality, comprehensive, and4
comparable financial statements tend to enjoy better developed stock markets than
countries where regulatory systems are less effective in encouraging firms to publish
useful information.  In sum, countries where legal codes stress the rights of
shareholders and where the regulatory system rigorously encourages corporate
information disclosure tend to have better developed financial markets.
•  Third, relatively uninformative financial statements combined with relatively weak
legal protection of minority shareholders help account for the comparably under-
developed state of Latin America’s stock exchanges and its disappointingly slow
growth.   Part of these characteristics can be traced back to Latin America’s French
legal tradition.  The Napoleonic Civil Code had a profound impact on many legal
systems.  The French-Napoleonic legal tradition, however, is strongly associated with
relatively under-developed financial systems.
3  Once one views the strong empirical
connection between the legal and regulatory environment, the financial system,
and growth, Latin America’s  legal and regulatory systems stand out as deserving
particularly careful scrutiny as it looks to accelerate economic development.
Methodologically, the paper primarily uses cross-country comparisons based on data from
45 countries over the period 1976-1994.  Each country is only one observation.   Two major
weaknesses of this methodology are that it does not provide a detailed evaluation of the particular
circumstances of any individual country; and, it focuses attention on Latin America as a region,
instead of on the individual countries that compose the region.  The strength of this analysis is that
it places Latin America in an international context.  This is critically important.  The cross-country
comparisons suggest an urgency that would not emerge from a country-specific study.  Namely,
Latin America, on average, has notably weaker legal codes in terms of the protection of minority5
shareholders than the rest of the world.  To an even greater degree, Latin American companies
tend to publish lower quality and less comprehensive financial statements.  Taking the strengths
and weaknesses of this cross-country methodology together, the results offer a broad reform
strategy.  The results do not offer a precise blueprint of how to reform the policies of any
particular country.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Sections II and III discuss the theories and empirical
evidence regarding the ties between stock markets, banks, and economic growth respectively.
Here, the issue is not whether stock prices efficiently reflect expectations about future corporate
profits.  Similarly, the issue is not whether quickly rising stock prices are good or bad.  The issue
is whether a well-developed  stock market – a market where it is relatively easy to trade
ownership of the country’s companies – helps that country grow faster.
The data show that even after controlling for many factors associated with growth, stock
market liquidity  --  as measured both by the value of stock trading relative to the size of the
market and by the value of trading relative to the size of the economy  --  is positively and
significantly correlated future rates of long-run economic growth.  A growing body of
microeconomic evidence supports this finding.  These results are consistent with the view that a
greater ability to trade ownership of an economy's companies facilitates faster economic growth.
Moreover, the level of banking development -- as measured by bank loans to private enterprises
divided by GDP -- also helps in predicting economic growth.  Since measures of stock market
liquidity and banking development both enter the growth regressions significantly, the findings
suggest that banks provided different financial services from those provided by stock markets.
Banking and stock market development in developing countries tend to complement each other,
not substitute for the other.6
Since better stock markets seem to boost economic development, policymakers have a
responsibility to implement legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that promote healthy stock
market development.  In turn, researchers have a responsibility to identify legal, regulatory, and
policy reforms that promote healthy stock market development.   Thus, Section IV examines the
relationship between stock market development and both the legal rights of shareholders and the
degree to which the regulatory regime successfully encourages firms to publish comprehensive
financial statements.
The data suggest a strong link between stock market development and a country’s legal
and regulatory environment.  Countries were the legal system emphasizes the rights of minority
shareholders and where the regulatory/accounting regime produces high quality information about
firms have larger stock markets, where size is measured both by market capitalization and by the
number primary market issues.  Furthermore, the relationship between accounting standards and
stock market liquidity is significant and economically meaningful.  The data imply that one
standard deviation increase in information disclosure increases liquidity by the median value of the
sample.
This paper then traces the impact of differences in the legal and regulatory environment on
stock market development through to economic growth.  Specifically, I use measures of the legal
rights of minority shareholders and the regulatory regime’s ability to encourage high-quality
corporate reports as instrumental variables.  I use these instrumental variables to extract the
exogenous component of stock market development – the component of stock market
development defined by the legal and accounting environment.  There are good reasons to use
measures of the legal and regulatory environment as instrumental variables  First, they are direct
policy levers.  Second, the current legal/regulatory environment has been heavily influenced by7
legal heritage. In particular, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996,1997) show
that differences in the legal treatment of shareholders and the quality of corporate annual reports
are systematically linked to the country’s legal origin.  Based on the work of legal scholars, they
categorize countries as having predominantly English, French, German, or Scandinavian legal
origins.  Since most countries obtained their legal systems through occupation and colonization
and since these systems vary little over time, the legal variables are treated as exogenous for the
1976-1993 period.  Thus, I test whether the exogenous component of stock market development
– the component of stock market development defined by the legal and accounting regime – is
positively associated with long-run economic growth.
The impact of the exogenous component of stock market development on economic
growth is positive, statistically significant, robust, and economically meaningful.  The results imply
that if Latin America implemented regulatory reforms that improved the quality of its corporate
statements from its current value of 48 to the average for the OECD (65), then this would boost
stock market liquidity and thereby accelerate real per capita GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points
per year.  This is large, considering that median real per capita GDP growth for the whole sample
is only about 1.9 percent.
Section V spends considerable space highlighting this paper’s limitations.  Section VI
provides policy recommendations and attempts to go beyond the specific legal and regulatory
variables used in this paper.  There may be ways of improving the position of minority
shareholders and the quality of published information on firms without fundamentally altering
legal codes.  These suggestions may offer practical avenues for boosting financial system
development and growth.8
II. Theory: Stock Markets and Economic Development
A. Finance and growth: A theoretical overview
There are good theoretical reasons for believing that the financial system influences the
rate of economic growth.
4   In a frictionless world, capital flows toward the most profitable
activities and it is easy to write and enforce contracts that align the interests of managers and
owners.  Similarly, in a frictionless world, individuals costly diversify and pool risks and easily find
buyers or sellers for securities at well-known prices.  But, the world is not frictionless.  There are
large costs associated with researching firms.  There are large information and contracting costs
associated with monitoring managers and encouraging them to act in the best interests of firm
owners.
5  It is expensive to mobilize capital from disparate savers.  Furthermore, an array of
costly contractual and institutional arrangements must arise to reduce the costs to savers and
investors of pooling risk and trading securities.  Financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries
have emerged to mitigate the negative consequences of these information, transaction, and
contracting costs.
6  These financial arrangements can reduce the adverse effects of market
frictions on resource allocation and growth.
Countries have different financial systems due to differences in legal tradition, politics,
policies, natural resource endowments, and perhaps historical accidents.  Financial systems differ
in their ability to identify profitable ventures, mobilize capital to fund those ventures, monitor and
create appropriate incentives for corporate managers, facilitate risk management and transactions,
and augment the ease and confidence with which agents can exchange assets.  These differences
may have profound implications on economic growth.9
B.  Theoretical issues on the channels from stock market to growth
An important channel via which financial systems affect economic activity is through
productivity.  For example, Joseph Schumpeter (1912, p. 74) argued that, “The banker, therefore,
is not so much primarily a middleman, … He authorises people, in the name of society as it were,
[to innovate].”  Thus, financial markets are not simply pipes via which funds flow.  According to
Schumpeter, better financial systems will find better quality investments, so that better financial
markets boost overall economic development by boosting productivity growth.
Better functioning equity markets may also affect productivity.   Many profitable
investments require a long-term commitment of capital, but investors are often reluctant to
relinquish control of their savings for long periods.  Liquid equity markets make long-term
investment more attractive because they allow savers sell equities quickly and cheaply if they need
access to their savings.  At the same time, companies enjoy permanent access to capital raised
through equity issues.  By facilitating longer-term, more profitable investments, liquid markets
improve the allocation of capital and thereby boost productivity growth.
7
Stock markets may also exert a positive impact on productivity growth by stimulating the
acquisition of information about firms.  Specifically, investors want to make a profit by identifying
undervalued stocks and exploiting this information by buying or selling equities quickly and
cheaply in liquid markets.   If markets are liquid, this will create incentives for investors to
evaluate firms energetically.  Alternatively, if markets are illiquid, investors have fewer incentives
to undertake the costly process of researching firms because they will not be confident about
exploiting any information advantage they have garnered in the market.
8  Thus, by stimulating the
acquisition of information about firms, liquid stock markets can improve the allocation of capital.10
C. Adverse implications of stock markets
Contentious theoretical debate exists, however, about the impact of financial systems in
general and stock markets in particular on economic development.
9  Theory suggests that greater
stock market liquidity has ambiguous effects on savings: if greater liquidity boosts the returns to
investment, this increase in returns has ambiguous effects on saving rates due to well-known
income and substitutions effects.  So, to the extent that financial development boosts investment
returns, it is unclear what will happen to saving rates.
10
Moreover, theoretical debate exists about whether greater stock market liquidity actually
encourages a shift to higher-return projects that stimulate productivity growth.   Since more
liquidity makes it easier to sell shares, some argue that more liquidity reduces the incentives of
shareholders to undertake the costly task of monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986;
Shleifer and Summers 1988; Bhide 1993).  In turn, weaker corporate governance impedes
effective resource allocation and slows productivity growth
 
D. Theory: Stock markets and banks may not be substitutes
Traditionally, development specialists have focused on banks and viewed stock markets as
unimportant sideshows.  They note that much more corporate capital is raised from banks than
from equity issues.  This traditional view ignores an important point: stock markets may provide
different financial services from banks.  Put differently, stock markets may positively affect
economic development even though not much capital is raised through them.  For instance, stock
markets may play a more prominent role in easing the risk trading and boosting liquidity.  In
contrast, banks may focus more on establishing long-run relationships with firms and monitoring11
managers.   To grow, economies need both liquidity and information about managers and
projects.
The point is not to draw too sharp a line between banks and markets.  Like stock markets,
banks help savers diversify risk and provide liquid deposits, which assists economic activity.  Like
banks, stock markets may stimulate the acquisition of information about firms, because investors
want to make a profit by identifying undervalued stocks.  The point is simply to highlight the
empirical nature of the questions at hand: Do stock markets boost economic development?  Do
stock markets boost economic development independently of the level of banking development?
Are there interactions between stock markets and banks?
III. Evidence on Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth
Substantial evidence supports the view that better financial systems in general and stock
markets in particular boost economic growth.  Levine (1997a) compiles and analyzes this
evidence.  Consequently, the following sections present figures that summarize the main cross-
country findings on stock markets and growth.  These involve data on a maximum of 45 countries
over the period 1976-1993.
11   The section also presents new evidence on the impact of primary
market development on economic growth.  This contrasts with past work, which focuses
exclusively on secondary market development.  Furthermore, I also summarize microeconomic
and time-series evidence regarding the link between stock markets and growth.  Special attention
is given to the joint role of banks and stock markets in facilitating economic development.12
A.  Measures of stock market development
This paper uses two measures of stock market liquidity.  The first equals the total value of
the trades of domestic stock on domestic stock exchanges divided by GDP and is called  Value
Traded.
12  While not a direct measure of trading costs or the uncertainty associated with trading
on a particular exchange, theoretical models of stock market liquidity and economic growth
directly motivate Value Traded (Levine 1991; Bencivenga et al. 1995).  Value Traded measures
trading volume as a share of national output and should therefore positively reflect liquidity on an
economy-wide basis.  The value-traded ratio is likely to vary with the ease of trading: if it is costly
and risky to trade, there will tend to be less trading.
The second measure of stock market liquidity, Turnover, equals the value of domestic
shares traded on domestic exchanges divided by the value of listed  shares. While Value Traded
captures trading relative to the size of the economy, Turnover measures trading relative to the
size of the market.  Thus, a small, liquid market will have high Turnover but small Value Traded.
To measure the size of the secondary market, I use Capitalization, which equals the value
of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP.  Although large markets do not
necessarily function well and taxes may distort incentives to list on the exchange, many observers
use Capitalization as an indicator of market development.
To measure the size of the primary market, I use IPO, which equals the number of initial
public offerings of shares in each country relative to the size of the population (in millions).  While
initial public offerings may reflect many phenomena, I wanted to get some indication of external
equity financing.  This measure is taken from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997).  Where as the other stock market indicators are available for the period 1976-1993, IPO
is measured only over the period mid-1995 to mid-1996 due to data availability.
1313
Finally, I use a measure stock return volatility.  Specifically, Volatility is as a twelve-
month rolling standard deviation estimate that is based on market returns, where the return series
is cleansed of monthly means and twelve months of autocorrelations [Schwert 1989].
B.  Liquidity and growth
This subsection begins an assessment of whether developing country stock markets are
simply casinos where an increasing number of foreigners are coming to place bets, or whether the
developing countries themselves reap large benefits from having access to liquid stock markets.
The data suggest that stock markets are not simply casinos.  There is a very strong link between
stock market liquidity and future long-run growth.
Figure 1 shows that countries that had relatively liquid stock exchanges in 1976 tended to
grow much faster over the next 18 years.  To illustrate this, I use Value Traded for the 38
countries with data in 1976. The countries are first ranked by the liquidity of their stock markets.
The first group has the nine most illiquid markets; the second group has the next 10 most illiquid
markets; the third group has the next 10; and the final group has the nine countries with the
largest value-traded ratios.  Figure 1 shows there is a systematic relationship between initial
liquidity and future real per capita GDP growth.
14
For developing countries, the returns to boosting stock market liquidity may be large.
Here, it is important to note that the strong link between liquidity and growth remains strong even
after controlling for cross-country differences in inflation, fiscal policy, political stability,
education, the efficiency of the legal system, exchange rate policy, and openness to international
trade as shown in Levine and Zervos (1997a).  Thus, it is not that stock market liquidity is merely
highly correlated with non-financial factors that are the real causes of economic growth.  Raising14
stock market liquidity may independently produce big growth dividends.  For example, regression
analyses imply that if Mexico’s value-traded ratio in 1976 had been the average of all 38 countries
(0.06 instead of 0.01), the average Mexican’s income would be 8 percent greater today.  This
forecast must be viewed cautiously, however, since it does not specify how to enhance liquidity.
Nevertheless, the example does illustrate the potentially large economic costs of policy,
regulatory, and legal impediments to stock market development.
C.  Size, volatility and growth
Other measures of stock market development do not tell the same story.  For example,
stock market size, as measured by market capitalization divided by GDP, is not a good predictor
of future economic growth (figure 2), and greater stock return volatility does not forecast poor
economic performance (figure 3).  Countries with large stock markets appear no more likely than
those with small ones to grow quickly.  Nor does there seem to be a strong link between stock
market volatility and economic growth.   Liquidity – the ability to buy and sell equities easily – is
what exhibits the strong connection to long-run growth.
D. IPOs and growth
This paper also examines the relationship between the primary equity market and long-run
growth.  This has not been studied before.  With the full sample of countries, there is not a clear
positive link between  IPO and growth as illustrated in Figure 4.  This lack of a strong link is
supported by regression analyses that control for other country characteristics.  However, it is
important to note that two countries skew these results.  That is, Taiwan and Korea are the fastest
growers but have virtually no recorded IPO activity over the limited time period for which I15
currently have data.  If these countries are omitted, the positive relationship between growth and
IPO becomes stronger as shown in Table 1.  Table 1 presents regression results of average annual
real per capita GDP growth over the 1976-1993 period (GROWTH) on IPO, while controlling for
an assortment of other country characteristics.  There is one observation per country.  I follow the
standard cross-country growth literature in controlling for a range of other country characteristics
(e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997; and Levine and Renelt 1992).  In
regression (1), I control for the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (Income), the logarithm of
secondary school enrollment (Enrollment), and the number of revolutions and coups per year
(Revolutions).  Regression (2) also includes the average annual inflation rate (Inflation) and the
ratio of central government spending to GDP (Government).  Regression (3) also adds the
average annual black market exchange rate premium (Black Market Premium).
IPO is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth in regressions (1) and
(2) at the 5 percent significance level, when Taiwan and Korea are excluded.  When also
controlling for Black Market Premium, the P-values rises to 0.087.  This suggestive, though still
inconclusive evidence, begs further study of the ties between long-run growth and primary market
development.  In sum, the above analysis focuses the growth spot light on stock market liquidity
and leaves , at least for now, other characteristics of stock markets in the shadows.
E. Stock markets, banks, and growth
The above analysis may elicit the following skeptical inquiry: Is there really an independent
link between stock market liquidity and growth, or is stock market development merely highly
correlated with banking sector development.   Perhaps, banks are the real financial engines of
growth and stock markets are mere sideshows.  Indeed, Figure 5 shows that countries with well-16
developed banking systems – as measured by bank loans to private enterprises as a share of GDP
– tend to grow faster than countries with underdeveloped banks.
15
Empirically, the effect of stock markets on growth can be distinguished from the impact of
banking development.  To show this, the 38 countries were divided into four groups.   The first
group had greater-than-median stock market liquidity (as measured Value Traded) in 1976 and
greater-than-median banking development.  Group two had liquid stock markets in 1976 but less-
than-median banking development.  Group three had less-than-median stock market liquidity in
1976 but well-developed banks.  Group four had illiquid stock markets in 1976 and less-than-
median banking development.
Countries with both liquid stock markets and well-developed banks grew faster than
countries with both illiquid markets and under-developed banks (figure 6).  More interestingly,
greater stock market liquidity implies faster growth no matter what the level of banking
development.  Similarly, greater banking development implies faster growth regardless of the level
of stock market liquidity.   If one uses Turnover, one gets the same results.  Moreover, after
controlling for other country characteristics such as initial income, schooling, political stability,
monetary, fiscal, trade, and exchange rate policies, the data still indicate that there is a strong link
between growth and each measure of financial sector development (as shown in Levine and
Zervos 1997a).
F. Growth: Potential interactions between banks and markets
The strong, positive link between economic growth and both stock market banking sector
development suggests a two-part question about the interactions between stock markets and
banks:17
Will an increase in banking development have a bigger (or smaller impact) on
growth in the presence of relatively well-developed stock market; And will an
increase in stock market development have a bigger (smaller impact) on growth in
the presence of a relatively well-developed banking sector?
To study this question, I used interaction terms.  Specifically, let SMI stand for Stock
Market Indicator, which can either equal Capitalization, IPO, Value Traded, or Turnover.  Let,
Bank equal the bank development indicator, bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP.
Finally, let X equal a matrix of control variables such as initial income, the level of schooling, and
indicators of political stability, monetary, fiscal, trade, and exchange rate policies.  Then, the
following cross-country regressions were run:
GROWTH = a(X) + b(SMI) + c(Bank) +d(SMI*Bank) + u,
where u is the regression residual.  If the coefficient, d, on the interaction term, SMI*Bank, is
positive this would imply that an increase in stock market development, SMI, would have a
bigger, positive impact on Growth, the greater the level of banking development.   This was not
the case, however.  In all specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term, d,  was highly
insignificant.  Taken together with the findings reported above, the data suggest that stock
markets and banks are positively associated with growth.  The data do not support the view that
an improvement in stock market development will positively affect growth more in a country with
a well-developed banking system.  In sum, it is not stock markets versus banks, it is stock markets
and banks.  Each of these components of the financial system is an independently strong predictor
of growth.18
G. Other evidence
Although I present new evidence on causality below, it is worth highlighting the results of
a growing body of empirical literature.  Using different empirical methodologies, a variety of
authors present evidence consistent with the view that finance causes growth.  Taking a
microeconomic approach, Rajan and Zingales (1997) show that, in countries with well-developed
financial systems, industries that are naturally heavy users of external financing grow relatively
faster than other industries.  Alternatively, in countries with poorly developed financial systems,
industries that are naturally heavy users of external financing grow more slowly than other
industries.  Furthermore, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) show that firms in countries
with better developed financial systems grow faster than they could have grown without this
access.  Also, in an innovative event study, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that when
individual states of the United States relaxed intrastate branching restrictions the quality of bank
loans rose and per capita GDP growth accelerated.  Furthermore, Levine (1997b,c) uses
instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of financial development.  Then, the
analyses show that the exogenous component of financial development is strongly, positively
correlated with economic growth.  Thus, while there is still room for skepticism, a growing and
diverse literature is consistent with the view that better financial systems cause faster economic
growth.
1619
IV. Legal Environment and Stock Market Development
Since the financial system importantly influences economic development, policymakers
have a responsibility to implement legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that promote healthy
financial sector development.  In turn, researchers have a responsibility to identify legal,
regulatory, and policy reforms that promote healthy financial sector development.   This section
examines the relationship between the legal and accounting environment and stock market
development.  Specifically, I quantify the link between stock market development and measures of
the legal treatment of shareholders and the effectiveness of the accounting system in providing
comprehensive and comparable information about firms to investors.  Finally,  I trace the link
from the legal and regulatory environment through stock market development and on to economic
growth.  Specifically, I study whether the exogenous component of stock market development –
the component of stock market development associated with the legal and regulatory environment
– explains long-run economic growth.
A.1. The legal environment: Overview
17
Roman law was compiled under the direction of Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the sixth
century.  Over subsequent centuries, Roman law was adapted, modified, and used throughout
continental Europe.  In the 17
th and 18
th centuries, the Scandinavian countries codified their
national laws.  Later, Napoleon directed the writing of the French Civil Code in 1804.  He made it
a priority to secure its adoption in all conquered territories, and France extended her legal
influence during the colonial era.  Furthermore, the French Civil Code shaped the Portuguese and
Spanish legal systems, with obvious implications for Central and South America.  Almost a
century later, Bismarck directed the writing of the German Civil Code.  The English legal system,20
which is a common law rather than a civil law country, was also spread primarily through
colonialism.
Based on the work of legal scholars, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1996; henceforth LLSV) categorize countries as having predominantly English, French, German,
and Scandinavian legal origins.  Since English, French, and German systems were spread primarily
through conquest and imperialism, I view legal origin as an exogenous “endowment” in studying
the relationship between the legal system and financial sector development.
LLSV (1996) show that legal origin materially influences the legal treatment of
shareholders and regulations governing corporate information.  English law countries have laws
that emphasize the rights of minority shareholders to a greater degree than the French, German,
and Scandinavian countries.  French civil law countries protect shareholders the least, with
German and Scandinavian civil law countries falling in the middle.  In terms of regulations
governing corporate information disclosure, countries with a French legal heritage have the
lowest quality information. Thus, the current legal/regulatory environment has been heavily
influenced by factors associated with legal heritage.
A.2. The legal environment: Data
Consider the connection between the legal protection of minority shareholders and the
liquidity of equity markets.  Conceptually, legal systems that protect shareholders, especially
minority shareholders, encourage greater participation.  Shareholders exercise their power by
voting for directors.  Thus, to quantify the legal treatment of shareholders, I use five measures of
the voting rights of shareholders.
18
PROXY equals 1 if shareholders can vote either by showing up in person, sending an
authorized representative, or mailing in their vote.  PROXY equals 0 if shareholders cannot vote21
by mail.  This can impede shareholder participation since because they must either attend the
meeting or go through the legal procedure of designating an authorized representative.
CUMULATIVE equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders
to cast all of their vote for one candidate, and 0 otherwise.  The ability to vote all one’s shares for
one candidate may make it easier for minority shareholders to put their representatives on boards
of directors.
BLOCKED equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code does not allow firms to
require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting, thus
preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, and 0 otherwise.  When shares
are blocked in this manner, the shares are kept in custody until a few days after the meeting.  This
practice prevents shareholders who do not bother to go through this arduous exercise from
voting.
MINOR equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders
either a judicial venue to challenge the management decisions or the right to step out of the
company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to certain
fundamental changes, such as mergers, assets dispositions and changes in the articles of
incorporation.  The variable equals 0 otherwise.
MEETING equals 1 if the minimum percentage of ownership share capital that entitles a
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than 10 percent, and 0
otherwise.  The minimum percentage of ownership share capital that entitles a shareholder to call
for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting ranges from one to 33 percent with a median of 10
percent.   Mexico has the highest value in the sample of countries.  Presumably, the harder it is for22
minority shareholders to call a meeting and contest management the less attractive it will be for
agents to participate in equity markets.
SRIGHTS aggregates these five indicators into a conglomerate index of shareholder
rights.
A.3. The regulatory/accounting environment: Data
Besides the legal rights of shareholders, it is also important to consider information about
firms.  Information about corporations is critical for exerting corporate governance and
identifying the best investments.  These activities will be facilitated by accounting standards that
simplify the interpretability and comparability of information across corporations.  Furthermore,
many types of financial contracting use accounting measures to trigger particular actions.  These
types of contracts can only be enforced and will only be used if accounting measures are
reasonably unambiguous.  Since accurate information about corporations may improve financial
contracting and intermediation, the paper examines a measure of the quality, comprehensiveness,
and comparability of information disclosed through corporate accounts from LLSV (1996).
Accounting standards differ across countries and governments impose an assortment of
regulations regarding information disclosure and accounting standards.  Thus, I often refer to
measures of the quality of information in corporate financial statements as reflecting the
regulatory system.
ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness and quality of company reports.  The
maximum possible value is 90 and the minimum is 0.  The Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research assessed general accounting information, income statements, balance
sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, and stock data in company reports in 1990.
Given the importance of information in financial contracting, I expect ACCOUNT to be positively23
correlated with stock market activity.
A.4. Summary statistics on the legal and accounting environment
Table 2 provides summary statistics on SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT.  The data are sorted
by region.  There is substantial cross-country variation, where the maximum value is 5, the
minimum value is 0, and the standard deviation is about 1.2.  Belgium, Italy, and Mexico (all
countries with a French legal origin) are countries where SRIGHTS equals the minimum value of
zero, indicating that their legal systems do not stress the rights of minority shareholders.  In
contrast, the legal codes of the United States stress the rights of shareholders, such that
SRIGHTS=5.
The French legal tradition is clearly evident in Latin America.  This region’s legal system
places comparatively less emphasis on the legal rights of shareholders, particularly minority
shareholders, than other regions.  It is also important to note the cross-Latin America variation.
The legal codes of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile actually place a comparatively high priority on
minority shareholder rights, while Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are far below the
international average.  In terms of ACCOUNT, Latin America tends to provide less
comprehensive and comparable information about corporations to investors as shown by the low
value of ACCOUNT in Table 2.  Moreover, Latin America’s (overall) comparatively weak legal
protection of shareholders and its relatively uninformative accounting systems have a price:
comparatively poor stock markets.  Latin America’s stock markets over the period tended to be
smaller (Capitalization, IPO) less active (Value Traded), and more volatile (Volatility) than the
markets of other regions of the world as shown in Table 2.  Finally, it is worth noting that a
general index of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts (ENFORCE) is also24
notably lower in Latin America.  As emphasized by LLSV (1996, 1997), these tendencies can be
traced back to Latin America’s French legal heritage as illustrated by Table 2b.
B.  Regressions of stock market size on legal and accounting variables
  Table 3 presents cross-country regressions that examine more rigorously the connection
between the legal rights of shareholders, the accounting regime, and stock market size.  The
dependent variables is either Capitalization or IPO.  As regressors, each of the regressions
includes a constant and INCOME.  I control for INCOME since the overall level of economic
development may influence stock market size.  I want to isolate the relationship between market
size and both the legal rights of shareholders, SRIGHTS, and the quality of corporate financial
statements, ACCOUNT.  Regression 1 includes the constant, INCOME and SRIGHTS.
Regression 2 includes a constant, INCOME, and ACCOUNT.  Regression 3 includes all of the
explanatory variables.
  The data indicate a strong link between SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT.  Both SRIGHTS and
ACCOUNT enter all of the regressions with positive and significant coefficients (at the 0.05
level).  Even after controlling for the level of real per capita GDP, countries with legal systems
that emphasize the rights of shareholders – especially minority shareholders – enjoy larger
markets.  Similarly, countries that have regulatory/accounting regimes that produce comparable
and comprehensive information about firms tend to have larger stock markets.  The data also
suggest that the links are economically large.  For instance, a one standard deviation increase in
ACCOUNT (12) translates into a 0.144 rise in Capitalization (0.144=12*0.12), which is a bit less
than the median value of Capitalization (0.19).25
C.  Regression of stock market liquidity on legal and accounting variables
The data also indicate a strong link between stock market liquidity and the availability of
high quality information about firms.   As shown in Table 4, there is a statistically significant
relationship between ACCOUNT and the two measures of stock market liquidity, Value Traded
and Turnover when controlling for the legal rights of shareholders.  In contrast, shareholder rights
do not have a very robust link with stock market liquidity.  This differs from the results in Table 3,
where SRIGHTS were strongly linked with markets size.  Thus, good information, ACCOUNT, is
strongly linked with both market size and liquidity, while SRIGHTS is strongly associated with
overall market size, but not with market activity.  These findings stress the importance of good
regulations governing information disclosure.
19  Furthermore, the relationship between
ACCOUNT and liquidity is economically meaningful.  For example, a one standard deviation
increase in ACCOUNT (12) increases Value Traded by 0.058 (0.058= 0.0048*12), which is about
the median value of Value Traded in the sample (0.054).  Although the R-squares in these
regressions are low, about 10 percent, the legal and accounting variables do help account for
cross-country variations in stock market size and liquidity.
Before continuing, it is critical to note that SRIGHTS is not simply proxying for the
overall quality of a country’s legal system.  As shown by Levine (1997b,c), legal variables that
define the rights of creditors are closely connected to banking sector development.  But,
SRIGHTS is not highly correlated with banking sector development.  Also, the legal rights of
creditors are not highly correlated with stock market development.  Thus, the legal variables are
capturing particular aspects of the legal environment.  They are not proxying for overall legal
efficiency.26
D. Link legal and regulatory environment to stock market and then to growth
Thus far, I have explored two distinct links in the chain running from policy levers to
economic growth.  First, there is a growing abundance of evidence that better functioning stock
markets are associated with more rapid economic growth.  Second, there are particular
characteristics of legal and regulatory systems that promote better functioning stock markets.
Moreover, Latin American countries, perhaps because of their French legal heritage, tend to have
legal and regulatory (accounting) systems that discourage stock market development.  The
general implication of these findings is that policymakers can promote economic development by
legal and regulatory changes that bolster the legal rights of shareholders and encourage firms to
publish comparable and comprehensive financial statements.  The analysis, however, has not yet
put the two links of the chain together.
This subsection uses instrumental variables procedures to determine whether the
exogenous component of stock market development is linked with long-run growth.  Specifically,
I examine the component of stock market development defined by the legal and regulatory regime
is positively associated with economic growth.  As instrumental variables, I use the SRIGHTS and
ACCOUNT variables defined above. The basic regression takes the form:
(1) GROWTH = a + bSMI + gX + e,
where the dependent variable, GROWTH is real per capita GDP growth over the 1976-1993
period,  SMI is either Value Traded, Turnover, Capitalization, or IPO, and  X  represents a matrix
of conditioning information that controls for other factors associated with economic growth.  I27
use SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT as instrumental variables for each of the SMI indicators and use a
Generalized Method of Moments estimator.
To control for “other factors,”  I include three different conditioning information sets.
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Conditioning information set #1 includes a constant, the logarithm of initial per capita GDP, the
logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment, and the number of revolutions and coups.
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Conditioning information set #2 includes these variables plus the government spending to GDP,
inflation, and the black market exchange rate premium.  Conditioning information set #3 includes
all the control variables in conditioning information set #2 plus Bank, which equals bank credit to
the private sector divided by GDP.
The results indicate a strong, positive relationship between the exogenous component of
stock market development and economic growth.  Table 5 summarizes the results from twelve
GMM regressions: three regressions, based on the three conditioning information sets, for each of
the four stock market indicators, Value Traded, Turnover, Capitalization, and IPO.  After
controlling for a wide array of factors,  the exogenous component of Value Traded,
Capitalization, and IPO all enter the growth regression with coefficients that are significant at the
0.05 level and Turnover is significant at the 0.10 level.  Moreover, the strong link between the
exogenous component of stock market development and growth holds using alternative
instrumental variables.  Specifically, I also used the dummy variables for legal origin, either
English, French, or German, as instrumental variables without using SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT.
I did this because some may view the legal origin variables as better instruments than SRIGHTS
and ACCOUNT because legal origin is less prone to endogeneity problems.  The results with
these alternative instruments are very similar to those reported in Table 5: The stock market
indicators are robustly correlated with economic growth.  The exogenous component of stock28
market development – the component of stock market development defined by the legal and
accounting regime – is positively associated with long-run economic growth.
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The linkages from the regulatory regime through stock market liquidity to long-run
growth are economically meaningful.  For example, the results imply that if Argentina
implemented regulatory changes that improved the quality of corporate financial statements from
the recorded value of 45 to the average for OECD countries (65), the growth would be 0.6
percentage points faster per year.  This is quire large, considering that Argentina real per capita
GDP growth averaged only about 0.2 percentage points per year over this period.  Furthermore,
after a decade, 0.6 percentage points faster per capita GDP growth implies that each Argentinean
would be earning 6 percent more per year.  This is meant to be illustrative.  Since the analysis
does not consider any country in detail, the coefficients should not be applied to any individual
country.  Instead, the example serves to demonstrate the large potential costs, in terms of slower
long-run growth, of permitting poor information disclosure to persist.
V. Cautionary Notes
It is important to be clear about what these results do not show.
First, the paper does not show that economic growth does not influence stock markets.
The results do not contradict the argument that causality runs in both directions: financial
development influences economic growth, and economic growth influences financial sector
development.  Rather, this paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that the exogenous
component of stock market development promotes economic growth.
Second, this paper does not examine a slew of factors that may influence the operation of
stock markets.  For instance, a wide range of regulations influence stock market activity beyond29
those summarized by SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT.  These range from listing requirements, to
requirements governing the trading of securities, to supervision of broker/dealers, etc.
Furthermore, the paper does not consider differences in the organization and trading technologies
of individual exchanges.  Market microstructure may importantly influence stock market
development.  These factors were omitted due to data availability, not to potential relevance.
Rather, this paper makes more limited points: legal heritage is closely linked to the legal rights of
shareholders and the quality of corporate financial statements; legal and accounting characteristics
influence stock market size and liquidity; and the exogenous component of stock market
development is strongly linked with long-run rates of economic growth.
Third, the empirical results in conjunction with the theoretical overview do not imply that
every country needs its own active bourse. Conceptually, firms and savers benefit from easy
access to liquid stock markets.  It is the ability to trade and issue securities easily that facilitates
long-term growth, not the geographical location of the market.  Thus, capital control liberalization
may improve the ability of firms to raise capital both by improving the liquidity of domestic
exchanges and by providing greater access to foreign exchanges.
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Fourth, as noted earlier, this paper uses cross-country comparisons.  It does not examine
any single country in depth.  Thus, while the paper has very clear policy implications, these must
be viewed as illuminating a reform strategy.  The paper does not offer a precise blueprint.
Nonetheless, the results – and therefore the policy implications – jump-out.  Particular
characteristics of the legal and regulatory environment are strongly linked with how well the stock
exchange operates, with important spillovers for economic development.
Finally, things are changing in Latin America, and “Latin America” is not a single entity.
By making broad international comparisons, I do not focus on inter-Latin America differences.30
For  example, while Mexico has comparatively good accounting standards, the quality of the
financial statements for the rest of the countries of Latin America average almost two standard
deviations below the international mean.  Nevertheless, the strong connections between its
Napoleonic legal heritage, its generally weak legal and regulatory framework, its comparatively
poorly developed markets, and its less than desirable rate of growth certainly make this analysis as
relevant for Latin America as for any other region.  It is also true that many countries have
engaged in serious reforms to improve the operations of their markets.  Nonetheless, the time
period does not seem to dictate the results.  For example, if you considers only the 1990s, Latin
America still suffers by international comparisons.  For those countries that have already
implemented reforms to boost shareholder rights, improve information availability, and enhance
the operation of stock exchanges, this paper can be viewed as encouragement for a road already
begun rather than as suggesting a new direction for policy reform.
VI. Conclusions and Policy Tips
The paper shows that particular characteristics of national legal and regulatory systems --
the protection of minority shareholders and the quality of corporate financial statements -- exert a
major influence on stock market development.  Stock markets, in turn, help determine the rate of
long-run growth.  Walter Bagehot argued in the mid-1800s that only excellent financial systems
funnel capital to those enterprises that spur economic growth.  This paper builds on the work of
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) in showing that the legal and regulatory
system play enormous roles in determining which financial systems are excellent.  Moreover, the
paper shows that Latin America stands out.  It has relatively weak accounting standards and Latin
America’s legal system is comparatively lax in enforcing the rights of minority shareholders.31
Once one views the strong empirical connection between the legal and regulatory
environment, the financial system, and growth, Latin America’s  legal and regulatory systems
stand out as deserving particularly careful scrutiny as it looks to promote faster growth in the
future.
The analysis in the paper supports a two-pronged reform strategy.  First, the results
motivate a detailed evaluation of the legal treatment of minority shareholders and regulatory and
policy changes that can improve the quality, comparability, and comprehensiveness of information
about corporations.   Improvements along these lines offer substantial growth dividends.
The second prong recognizes that it is very difficult to change legal codes and searches for
other means of boosting the position of minority shareholders and fostering better accounting
standards.  For instance, stock exchanges can promote better corporate governance through their
listing requirements.  As a condition to having its securities traded on the exchange, a company
can be required to adopt more effective means of protecting minority shareholders.  This might
include (1)  greater information disclosure by listed companies - both periodic reporting and
requirements to make timely disclosure of special events (including transactions with affiliates),
(2) tighter accounting standards, and (3) creating and promoting standards for arbitration of
shareholder claims (or perhaps sponsor its own arbitration system).   Furthermore, regulators and
exchange officials could encourage companies to incorporate into their articles of
incorporation/by-laws important minority shareholder protections that go beyond those currently
required by law.  These additional provisions can include (1) outside (non-management) director
requirements, (2) disclosure of related party transactions and management compensation, (3)
super-majority or outside director approval for transactions with related parties, (4) rotation of32
outside independent auditors, (5) periodic reporting by outside auditors to shareholders, and (6)
mandatory private arbitration of disputes between shareholders and the company/management.
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In sum, the data point to large economic gains from improving the legal rights of creditors
and the quality and quantity of information available to investors.  While this paper’s results are
not Latin American specific, international comparisons suggest both an urgency and an
opportunity.  Specifically, Latin America has remarkably weak shareholder rights and poor
information about corporations.  These weaknesses may stem, in part, from its Napoleonic legal
heritage.  Thus, legal and regulatory reforms offer material opportunities for promoting economic
development in Latin America.33
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C Ca an na ad da a, ,   C Ch hi il le e, ,   C Co ol lo om mb bi ia a, ,   C Co ot te e   d d' 'I Iv vo oi ir re e, ,   C Co os st ta a   R Ri ic ca a, ,   G Ge er rm ma an ny y, ,   D De en nm ma ar rk k, ,   E Eg gy yp pt t, ,   S Sp pa ai in n, ,   F Fi in nl la an nd d, ,   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   U Un ni it te ed d
K Ki in ng gd do om m, ,   G Gr re ee ec ce e, ,   H Ho on ng g   K Ko on ng g, ,   I In nd do on ne es si ia a, ,   I In nd di ia a, ,   I Is sr ra ae el l, ,   I It ta al ly y, ,   J Ja am ma ai ic ca a, ,   J Jo or rd da an n, ,   J Ja ap pa an n, ,   K Ko or re ea a, ,   L Lu ux xe em mb bo ou ur rg g, ,
M Me ex xi ic co o, ,   M Ma al la ay ys si ia a, ,   M Mo or ro oc cc co o, ,   N Ni ig ge er ri ia a, ,   T Th he e   N Ne et th he er rl la an nd ds s, ,   N No or rw wa ay y, ,   N Ne ew w   Z Ze ea al la an nd d, ,   P Pa ak ki is st ta an n, ,   P Pe er ru u, ,   P Ph hi il li ip pp pi in ne es s, ,
P Po or rt tu ug ga al l, ,   S Si in ng ga ap po or re e, ,   S Sw we ed de en n, ,   S Sr ri i   L La an nk ka a, ,   T Th ha ai il la an nd d, ,   T Tu ur rk ke ey y, ,   T Ta ai iw wa an n, ,   U Un ni it te ed d   S St ta at te es s, ,   V Ve en ne ez zu ue el la a, ,   a an nd d   Z Zi im mb ba ab bw we e. .
1 12 2      S St to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t   d da at ta a   a ar re e   f fr ro om m   t th he e   I In nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l   F Fi in na an nc ce e   C Co or rp po or ra at ti io on n’ ’s s   E Em me er rg gi in ng g   M Ma ar rk ke et t   D Da at ta a   B Ba as se e   ( (e el le ec ct tr ro on ni ic c
v ve er rs si io on n) )   a an nd d   t th he e   I In nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l   M Mo on ne et ta ar ry y   F Fu un nd d’ ’s s   I In nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l   F Fi in na an nc ci ia al l   S St ta at ti is st ti ic cs s. .
1 13 3   I I   a am m   i in n   t th he e   p pr ro oc ce es ss s   o of f   e ex xp pa an nd di in ng g   t th he e   d da at ta a   t to o   m mo or re e   y ye ea ar rs s   a an nd d   t to o   m me ea as su ur re e   t th he e   q qu ua an nt ti it ty y   o of f   f fu un nd ds s   r ra ai is se ed d   t th hr ro ou ug gh h
e eq qu ui it ty y   i is ss su ue es s. .
1 14 4   M Mo or re eo ov ve er r, ,   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   w wi it th h   t th he e   m mo os st t   l li iq qu ui id d   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et ts s   i in n   1 19 97 76 6   b bo ot th h   a ac cc cu um mu ul la at te ed d   m mo or re e   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a an nd d   e en nj jo oy ye ed d
f fa as st te er r   p pr ro od du uc ct ti iv vi it ty y   g gr ro ow wt th h   o ov ve er r   t th he e   n ne ex xt t   1 18 8   y ye ea ar rs s. .      S Se ee e   L Le ev vi in ne e   a an nd d   Z Ze er rv vo os s   ( (1 19 99 97 7a a) ). .
1 15 5   T Th hi is s   i is s   s sh ho ow wn n   m mo or re e   r ri ig go or ro ou us sl ly y   b by y   K Ki in ng g   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 93 3a a, ,b b) ). .36
1 16 6      H Ha an ns ss so on n   a an nd d   J Jo on nu un ng g   ( (1 19 99 97 7) ), ,   N Ne eu us ss se er r   a an nd d   K Ku ug gl le er r   ( (1 19 99 96 6) ), ,   R Ro ou us ss se ea au u   a an nd d   W Wa ac ch ht te el l   ( (1 19 99 97 7) ), ,   a an nd d   W Wa ac ch ht te el l   a an nd d
R Ro ou us ss se ea au u   ( (1 19 99 95 5) )   f fi in nd d   t th ha at t   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   i in nt te er rm me ed di ia at ti io on n   G Gr ra an ng ge er r- -c ca au us se es s   e ec co on no om mi ic c   p pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e. .      A Al ls so o, ,   s se ee e   K Ki in ng g   a an nd d
L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 93 3a a, ,b b) ), ,   w wh ho o   s sh ho ow w   t th ha at t   b ba an nk ki in ng g   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   i in n   1 19 96 60 0   p pr re ed di ic ct ts s   g gr ro ow wt th h   o ov ve er r   t th he e   n ne ex xt t   3 30 0   y ye ea ar rs s. .
1 17 7   M Mu uc ch h   o of f   t th hi is s   d di is sc cu us ss si io on n   o of f   c co om mp pa ar ra at ti iv ve e   l le eg ga al l   t tr ra ad di it ti io on ns s   f fo ol ll lo ow ws s   d di ir re ec ct tl ly y   f fr ro om m   G Gl le en nd do on n      e et t   a al l. .   ( (1 19 98 82 2) ). .
1 18 8      T Th he e   v va ar ri ia ab bl le e   d de es sc cr ri ip pt ti io on ns s   t th ha at t   f fo ol ll lo ow w   a ar re e   t ta ak ke en n   d di ir re ec ct tl ly y   f fr ro om m   L LL LS SV V. .
1 19 9   R Re ec ca al ll l   t th ha at t   t th he e   s st tr ro on ng g   b be et tw we ee en n   l lo on ng g- -r ru un n   g gr ro ow wt th h   a an nd d   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   r ru un ns s   p pr ri im ma ar ri il ly y   t th hr ro ou ug gh h   m ma ar rk ke et t
l li iq qu ui id di it ty y, ,   w wh hi ic ch h   h hi ig gh hl li ig gh ht ts s   t th he e   i im mp po or rt ta an nt t   o of f   c co om mp pr re eh he en ns si iv ve e   a an nd d   c co om mp pa ar ra ab bl le e   d da at ta a   i in n   f fa ac ci il li it ta at ti in ng g   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t
a ac ct ti iv vi it ty y. .
2 20 0      T Th he es se e   c co on nd di it ti io on ni in ng g   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n   s se et ts s   r re ef fl le ec ct t   t th he e   l la ar rg ge e   c cr ro os ss s- -c co ou un nt tr ry y   g gr ro ow wt th h   r re eg gr re es ss si io on n   l li it te er ra at tu ur re e. .      F Fo or r   a a
d di is sc cu us ss si io on n   o of f   t th he es se e   v va ar ri ia ab bl le es s, ,   s se ee e   B Ba ar rr ro o   a an nd d   S Sa al la a- -i i- -M Ma ar rt ti in n   ( (1 19 99 95 5) ), ,   E Ea as st te er rl ly y   a an nd d   L Le ev vi in ne e   ( (1 19 99 97 7) ), ,   o or r   L Le ev vi in ne e   a an nd d
R Re en ne el lt t   ( (1 19 99 92 2) ). .
2 21 1   T Th he e   i in ni it ti ia al l   i in nc co om me e   v va ar ri ia ab bl le e   i is s   u us se ed d   t to o   c ca ap pt tu ur re e   t th he e   c co on nv ve er rg ge en nc ce e   e ef ff fe ec ct t   h hi ig gh hl li ig gh ht te ed d   b by y   B Ba ar rr ro o   a an nd d   S Sa al la a- -i i- -M Ma ar rt ti in n
( (1 19 99 95 5) ). .      A As s   i in n   m ma an ny y   c cr ro os ss s- -c co ou un nt tr ry y   a an na al ly ys se es s, ,   i in ni it ti ia al l   s se ec co on nd da ar ry y   s sc ch ho oo ol l   e en nr ro ol ll lm me en nt t   i is s   u us se ed d   t to o   c co on nt tr ro ol l   f fo or r   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   i in n
h hu um ma an n   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ac cc cu um mu ul la at ti io on n   a as s   e em mp ph ha as si iz ze ed d   b by y   L Lu uc ca as s   ( (1 19 98 88 8) ). .      B Ba ar rr ro o   a an nd d   S Sa al la a- -i i- -M Ma ar rt ti in n   ( (1 19 99 95 5) )   e ex xa am mi in ne e   t th he e   l li in nk k
b be et tw we ee en n   p po ol li it ti ic ca al l   s st ta ab bi il li it ty y   a an nd d   e ec co on no om mi ic c   g gr ro ow wt th h. .
2 22 2   F Fu ur rt th he er rm mo or re e, ,   t th he e   d da at ta a   d do o   n no ot t   r re ej je ec ct t   t th he e   o or rt th ho og go on na al li it ty y   c co on nd di it ti io on ns s   i in n   a an ny y   o of f   t th he e   t tw we el lv ve e   r re eg gr re es ss si io on ns s; ;   t th he e   d da at ta a   d do o   n no ot t
r re ej je ec ct t   t th he e   o ov ve er ri id de en nt ti if fy yi in ng g   r re es st tr ri ic ct ti io on ns s, ,   w wh hi ic ch h   g gi iv ve es s   g gr re ea at t   c co on nf fi id de en nc ce e   i in n   t th he e   i in ns st tr ru um me en nt ta al l   v va ar ri ia ab bl le es s. .      T Th hu us s, ,   t th he e   r re es su ul lt ts s
a ar re e   c co on ns si is st te en nt t   w wi it th h   t th he e   s st ta at te em me en nt t   t th ha at t   t th he e   s sh ha ar re eh ho ol ld de er r   r ri ig gh ht ts s   ( (S SR RI IG GH HT TS S) )   a an nd d   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n   ( (A AC CC CO OU UN NT T) )   i in nd di ic ca at to or rs s
i in nf fl lu ue en nc ce e   g gr ro ow wt th h   o on nl ly y   t th hr ro ou ug gh h   t th he ei ir r   i im mp pa ac ct t   o on n   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et t   d de ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t. .
2 23 3      S Se ee e   L Le ev vi in ne e   a an nd d   Z Ze er rv vo os s   ( (1 19 99 97 7b b) )   f fo or r   e em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   e ev vi id de en nc ce e   t th ha at t   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   t th ha at t   l li ib be er ra al li iz ze e   i in nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l   c ca ap pi it ta al l   c co on nt tr ro ol l
r re es st tr ri ic ct ti io on ns s   s se ee e   a a   m ma ar rk ke ed d   i im mp pr ro ov ve em me en nt t   i in n   t th he e   f fu un nc ct ti io on ni in ng g   o of f   t th he ei ir r   s st to oc ck k   m ma ar rk ke et ts s. .
2 24 4   O Of f   c co ou ur rs se e, ,   t th he e   e ex xc ch ha an ng ge e   w wi il ll l   b be e   s se en ns si it ti iv ve e   t to o   t th he e   e ef ff fe ec ct ts s   s su uc ch h   a ad dd di it ti io on na al l   r re eq qu ui ir re em me en nt ts s   m ma ay y   h ha av ve e   o on n   t th he e   d de ec ci is si io on n   b by y
p po ot te en nt ti ia al l   i is ss su ue er rs s   t to o   l li is st t   t th he ei ir r   s se ec cu ur ri it ti ie es s   o on n   t th he e   e ex xc ch ha an ng ge e. .      N Ne ev ve er rt th he el le es ss s, ,   b be et tt te er r   c co or rp po or ra at te e   g go ov ve er rn na an nc ce e   w wi il ll l, ,   i in n   t th he e   l lo on ng g
r ru un n, ,   i in nc cr re ea as se e   t th he e   f fi in na an nc ci ia al l   b be en ne ef fi it ts s   o of f   l li is st ti in ng g   o on n   t th he e   e ex xc ch ha an ng ge e   b by y   p pr ro om mo ot ti in ng g   g gr re ea at te er r   p pa ar rt ti ic ci ip pa at ti io on n   b by y   s sa av ve er rs s. .